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ABSTRACT
This article explores the ability of local governments to impose discretionary
permit conditions, or "exactions, " to offset the burdens that new development
places upon existing infrastructure and the environment. Over fifteen years ago,
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, a
deeply divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment significantly restricts this governmental authority, for the clause
requires the judiciary to apply a more stringent level of scrutiny in reviewing
permit conditions than is accorded outright permit denials. These "regulatory
takings " decisions provide land use regulators with incentives to circumvent the
more stringent standard for permit conditions by under-regulating, over-
regulating, or engaging in unwelcome conduct associated with a repeat-player
theory. However, dicta in the Court's recent unanimous opinion in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. could be interpreted as limiting the application of the
stringent scrutiny established in Nollan and Dolan to a small subset of
exactions. This article seeks to provide some normative basis for understanding
why the Court issued a unanimous, albeit veiled, declaration in an exactions
takings arena that previously had been complicated by contentious policy
disputes.
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. Thank you to my
colleague Jason Gillmer and Professors Lawrence Church of the University of Wisconsin School of
Law, Mark Davis of Tulane University Law School, and Kenneth A. Stahl of Chapman University
School of Law for reviewing earlier drafts. Thanks also to participants in the 2009 Central States
Law Schools Association Conference for valuable comments and suggestions. This article also
greatly benefitted from the advice and recommendations provided at faculty colloquia at Villanova
University School of Law, the University of Mississippi School of Law, and Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law. The author can be reached at tmulvaney@law.txwes.edu.
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Remnants of Exaction Takings
INTRODUCTION
The original Euclidean model that either sanctioned or banned certain uses
according to static zoning maps has been replaced by a variety of flexible
planning tools. Today, local government's ability to exact concessions from
property owners in exchange for the conferral of discretionary development
permits generally is recognized as a permissible exercise of modem land use
authority. While these "exactions" commonly operate quite reasonably to offset
infrastructural burdens emanating from new development, such a discretionary
power inevitably is subject to exploitation. Defining the appropriate degree of
this discretion and identifying the institutional entities that should control it is
the subject of great scholarly debate.
From the emergence of exactions in the 1960s, the marketplace of municipal
competition for homeowners and businesses, the electoral process, local
regulatory codes, and state statutory and constitutional law have all operated as
de facto controls on the imposition of exactions.' In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission2 in 1987, and its inseparable rhyming partner, Dolan v.
City of Tigard3 in 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the federal
Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings Clause also places limits upon the
government's authority to condition land use permits.
For the better part of two decades, Nollan and Dolan effectively have required
lower courts to apply a stringent level of judicial scrutiny when reviewing
permit conditions. 4  However, the courts apply a deferential level of scrutiny
when reviewing permit denials. 5  This anomaly has created a strange set of
See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 473 (1991); David A. Dana, Land Use
Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Mark Fenster,
Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Constitutional Shadow].
2 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
3 Dolan v: City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Most jurists, scholars, and journalists assert
that "Nollan" and "Dolan" rhyme. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Clarifying the Supreme Court's
Taking Cases-An Irreverent but Otherwise Unassailable Draft Opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
71 DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 331 (1994); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into
the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1001 (1997); Michael M. Berger, Justice in
Rhyme: Will 'Dolan' Go Far to Explain 'Nollan'?, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 12, 1994. However, Chief
Justice Rehnquist may have begged to differ. At oral argument, the Chief Justice introduced
"Nollan" with a pronunciation resembling a short "o," as in the word "doll." See Recording of Oral
Argument, The Oyez Project, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_133 (follow
"Nollan v. California Coastal Commission -Oral Argument" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
"Exactions" and "permit conditions" will be used interchangeably herein.
See. e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny. 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1243, 1246 n.10 (1997).
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incentives for government officials reviewing permit applications, as the
difference in standards can lead to under-regulation, over-regulation, and repeat-
player concerns. 6  However, fairly cryptic dicta in the Supreme Court's
unanimous 2005 opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.7 could be interpreted
to provide some guidance on this apparent inconsistency.
The five-four decisions in Nollan and Dolan provide thrilling political theater,
evidencing the stark differences in the sitting Justices' perceptions of
government authority to manage private land uses. For instance, the Nollan
majority depicted the government as masters of "out-and-out extortion;"8 the
dissent suggested it is the private property owners "who are the interlopers" on
longstanding "public" rights.9 Perhaps not surprisingly, commentators have
categorized both opinions-like several others in the muddied field of Supreme
Court regulatory takings jurisprudence-as results-oriented rather than
theoretically cogent. 0
Compared to the flair of Nollan and Dolan, the Lingle dicta is dry, technical,
and devoid of pronouncements on policy, such that the complete rationale for
this dicta thus far has proven elusive. However, its influence on the body of
regulatory takings law ultimately may be quite significant. This dicta may
foretell a considerable narrowing of the application of Nollan and Dolan,
whereby their scrutiny is confined to those conditions requiring physical
occupation of private property.
This article explores the allocative inefficiencies and theoretical
inconsistencies in applying Nollan and Dolan to a broad set of permitting.
scenarios, as well as the existence of alternative local controls that restrain
government overreaching in the permit condition context. These theories may
work in concert to provide some normative basis for understanding why the
Lingle Court issued a unanimous, albeit veiled, declaration in an exactions
takings arena that previously had been complicated by contentious policy
disputes.
6 See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See. e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752
(1988); Michael B. Kent Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence after Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63 (2008); Floyd B. Olson, The
Enigma of Regulatorv Takings. 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433 (1994).
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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT PERMIT
EXACTIONS
In theory, land use exactions oblige property owners to internalize the
expected external burdens from their proposed intensified use of their land in
accord with a discretionarily issued government permit.'' In what several
scholars have referred to as "the end of the 'free ride' of the 1950s, local
governments seeking to avoid a slew of outright application denials trended
toward seeking contributions from permit recipients to cover infrastructural
impacts resulting from new development.' 2  Common infrastructural impacts
included increased roadway usage, sewage treatment, growth in school
populations, and parkland degradation.'13  Contributions accounting for these
impacts provided municipalities with an alternative method to pay for capital
facilities necessary to accommodate growth and its associated externalities in the
face of fervent voter opposition to new and increased taxation.' 4 In short, such
contributions assured that new residents pre-paid the costs of development.
This shift to buyer-financed infrastructure led to contentions of inequity,
inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in light of the piecemeal ad hoc decision-
making process of local land use permitting.' 5 In response, state courts and
See generally Been, supra note I; Daniel A. Crane, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings
after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (1996); Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra
note I; Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings Formalism];
Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182 (2004); Deborah Rhoads,
Developer Exactions and Public Decision Making in the United States and England, II ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 469 (1994); Nick Rosenberg, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost
Internalization Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (2003).
2 See DANIEL P. SELMI, ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 149 (3d ed. 2008).
13 See, e.g., Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees:
Development Exactions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835 (1993). The imposition of these
types of permit conditions ordinarily are of little contention when existing property owners have paid
for these infrastructural improvements, as the new developers otherwise would be undeserving
freeriders. However, to the extent these infrastructure improvements have been paid for by bonding,
future residents likely will pay off those bonds through their taxes, such that circumstances could
arise where exacting additional monies may result in overcharging.
W See EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND
FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA xxxiii (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds.,
1995).
IS See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 841-46 (1983) ("critics object most to the piecemeal
changes in local land regulations: the all-pervasive 'variance,' the 'conditional use permit,' or the
small-scale 'rezoning' ordinance"); DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 1042 (6th ed. 2006) ("for local.
communities, enacting regulations is like printing money, because the legal restrictions can be
relaxed in exchange for goods and services"); Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1, at 736-
40 (explaining how exacting the "true cost" of development without burdening the existing
community is not practical in light of imperfect information and political realities). Professor
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other institutions sought varying methods of assuring fairness in the imposition
of contributions as measured against the predicted project impacts.' 6 However,
beginning with Nollan in 1987 and continuing with Dolan seven years later, the
U.S. Supreme Court entered the exaction arena by extending its (at times)
obscure regulatory takings jurisprudence. The court declared that the federal
Takings Clause placed limits on the deference afforded to governments'
imposition of certain development conditions. Nollan and Dolan call for a more
stringent standard of review than most, if not all, state courts previously
employed in the permit condition context.
7
A. A Pr~cis on the Rise of Exaction Takings
Few scholars interpret historical evidence to support the contention that the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned the Takings Clause' 8 to restrict any
government action beyond physical invasions. Thus, regulations on the use of
private property that the state enacted and enforced in the interest of public
health, safety, and welfare originally were not subject to takings review.' 9
However, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a regulation that goes "too
far" such that the economic burden is the functional equivalent of a physical
Fenster also suggests that even "perfect" infrastructural exactions do not reflect the full cost of new
development because they do not consider socioeconomic needs related to housing and employment
opportunities. Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note I, at 737.
"b Compare Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (creating a deferential dual "rational nexus" test) and Associated Home Builders v. City of
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 615 (Cal. 1971) (requiring only a "reasonable" connection between
permit conditions and anticipated project impacts), with Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (111. 1961) (demanding need for infrastructure-related
condition be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the project's estimated impacts) and J.E.D.
Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (adopting "uniquely attributable"
test).
7 For a discussion of the various state approaches as compared to Dolan's "rouglh
proportionality" test, see infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
"b "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." See U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
19 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028, n.15 (agreeing that "early
constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all"
and relying on the "historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our
constitutional culture"); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1289-93 (1996) ("The reason the Framers did not
address land use regulation in the Takings Clause is that they did not regard it as a taking."); Richard
J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099, 1122 (1997); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 708-16 (1985) ("Madison
intended the clause to have narrow legal consequences: It was to apply only to the federal
government and only to physical takings.").
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appropriation is a taking. 20 It would be more than fifty years before the Court
set forth a test to analyze just when a regulation has gone "too far." The
Supreme Court's first attempt came in the 1978 case of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.
21
In Penn Central, the Court rejected a takings claim based on the designation
of a railroad terminal as a historic landmark. The Court set forth a multi-factor
balancing test for analyzing regulatory takings. This test focuses on the
economic impact of the regulation on the property owner, the degree to which
the regulation interferes with the owner's reasonable, "investment-backed
expectations," and the "character" of the regulation. 22  While these factors
seemingly focused on whether the burdens imposed on private property owners
through valid governmental action should instead be imposed upon the public as
a whole, the court also suggested in dicta that substantive review of a regulation
might be appropriate in takings analyses.23
Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,24 the Court drew on Penn
Central's dicta to declare that a land use regulation restricting development
density did not constitute a taking. 2' The Court held that the regulation at issue
"substantially advanced" the legitimate state interest of discouraging "premature
and unnecessary conversion of open-space to urban uses." 26 The Agins Court
asserted that its "substantially advance" test derived from three prior momentous
land use cases involving not takings, but substantive due process challenges.
27
These due process cases included Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,28
2(1 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
21 Penn Cent. Transport. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2' See id. at 124 (citations omitted) ("In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,
the Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So,
too, is the character of the governmental action."). As some scholars have noted, while the assertion
that the listed factors have "particular significance" suggests that other factors could be germane, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly expanded the list. See. e.g., John D. Echeverria, Making
Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 171, 171 n.4 (2005).
23 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 ("[I]t is, of course, implicit ... that a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose .... ).
24 Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
25 See id. at 260-62.
26 Id. at 261.
27 Id. at 261-62.
21 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (rejecting substantive due process
challenge to a municipal zoning ordinance because the ordinance was not "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable" and bore a "substantial relation for the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare").
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Nectow v. City of Cambridge,2 9 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.3 °
The Court did not rely explicitly on Agins when it later established two
narrow categories where government action amounts to a per se unconstitutional
taking.3' In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission32 and Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,33 respectively, the Court held that a
regulation that results in the loss of all economic value or in a physical
occupation of property eliminates the need for any balancing analysis under
Penn Central. However, the Agins "substantially advance" test did serve as the
foundation for the Court's opinions in the development permit condition cases
of Nollan and Dolan.34 That the Court unanimously abandoned the Agins test in
the 2005 case of Lingle, yet at the same time preserved some role for Nollan and
Dolan, precipitates a review and an analysis of the theoretical considerations
underlying the Court's exaction takings decisions.
Many U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings opinions, from the very first in
1922, reflect personal conjecture on relationships between public and private
actors and contain ruminations of how society should be organized. 35 In both
Nollan and Dolan, a conservative majority of the Court seemingly transformed a
normative value supporting private property rights protections into utilitarian
takings tests seeking to counteract what it viewed as extortionate government
practices. 36  For the majorities in Nollan and Dolan, the regulatory takings
29 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (striking down the application of a
zoning ordinance on substantive due process grounds because the application did not "bear a
substantial relation to the public, health, safety, morals or general welfare").
3" Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (declaring that plaintiff had not met
his burden of proving that an ordinance limiting the depth of excavations was unreasonable).
3' See Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) ("When ... a
regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes
beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain
it."); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) ("when the
'character of the governmental action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.") (internal
citations omitted).
32 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
33 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
1 For a discussion of Agins foundational service in Nollan and Dolan, see infra notes 46-111
and accompanying text.
11 See. e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752,
1772 (1988) ("Political vision has driven takings methodology.").
36 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority,
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ.); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U:S.
825 (1987) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & White, Powell, and
O'Connor, JJ.). One scholar has suggested that institutional limitations, primarily precedent from
the forty years following the Lochner era, have forced the more recently conservative U.S. Supreme
[Vol. 33:2
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doctrine became a corrective device to balance against incentives for abuse of
state permitting power.
Within this normative vision lies an inherent tension for proponents of strong
private property rights. On one hand, the movement seeks strong judicial
protections of property rights in light of its perception of municipal and state
legislatures as unheeding to their concerns. 37 On the other, it also respects the
democratic process and thus opposes the conception of judicial management of
local prerogatives. 38  This tension is evident on the other side of the policy
spectrum as well. More liberal-leaning jurists and scholars tend to find little
merit in most takings challenges, though they have at times selectively favored
national objectives that require superseding state and local policy decisions. 39
In regulatory takings cases, "oppositional" issues plague jurists of all policy-
driven persuasions. 40 These conflicting broader questions, which frequently arise
in a variety of substantive fields, lead to conclusions that may be contrary to a
given jurist's instinctive tendency. 4' As noted above, federalism and varying
perspectives on trust in governmental motives serve as the primary oppositional
issues in the takings debate.42
Court to adopt categorical rules in narrow areas "that allows distinctions between those laws not
previously adjudicated and similar laws previously upheld." See Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside
Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 595 (1998).
Professor McUsic contends that "although Court opinions suggest its discomfort with discretionary
decision-making, the Court decisions require more of it . . . for example*. . . in Nollan the Court
decision required the California Coastal Commission to abandon its rule requiring an easement as a
condition for each beach building permit, and in its stead adopt a system which (sic) devised a
condition for each permit based on the particulars of the building proposed." Id. at 657 n.304.
" See, e.g., Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use be Different? Reflections on Williamson
County 'Regional Planning Board. v. Hamilton Park, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 471, 471-72 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
3' See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1124 ("[Clonservatives, apparently enjoying a
convenient bout of temporary amnesia, enthusiastically turn to the courts to champion their vision of
wise social and economic policy [in takings cases]."); GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER, THE
CONSERVATIVE CENTURY: FROM REACTION TO REVOLUTION 159 (2009) ("Conservatives have long
seen the judicial activism of the Supreme Court as a major problem ... .
3' See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1123-24.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1121.
2 Id. at 1124-25. Convenient arguments on the Framer's original intent in drafting the Takings
Clause also permeate the takings debate. Compare Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding
of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1635 (1988), with Hart,
supra note 19, at 1289-93 (1996). The more conservative members of the Court read an expansive
regulatory takings doctrine into the Fifth Amendment that is dissimilar to the same members'
condemnation of such expansion in other areas of law. See. e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the
status of poor relation in these comparable circumstances."). Professor Lazarus posits that votes
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On the current U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Scalia is cited most often as the
guardian of private property rights.43 However, his interpretation of the Takings
Clause generally bears no evidence of the aforementioned tension associated
with property rights advocates. His positions have been quite difficult to
interpret as exercises in judicial restraint, as evidenced in the Nollan decision. 44
B. Qualitative Nature
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission conditioned a private
oceanfront landowner's redevelopment permit upon the provision of a public
transit corridor along the water. 5  With this corridor, the Commission
purportedly sought to offset the proposed project's impact on the public's view
of the water.46 Justice Scalia's opinion for the five-Justice majority described
based on one or another "oppositional" issue are "not necessarily the product of illogic or
inconsistency; instead they may reflect potential accommodation and the seeds of future compromise
between what long have remained opposing, irreconcilable views." Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1131.
He suggests that the briefs and oral argument made before the Court demonstrate that "the most
effective way to obtain a Justice's vote is to use one of the crosscutting issues as leverage to support
his or her view of the merits of the regulatory takings claim." Id. at 1130. Professor Lazarus
continues, "[S]cholars and practitioners seeking to proffer a workable test for regulatory takings
analysis are mistaken if they focus on the property rights issue in isolation." Id. at 1131.
13 As one scholar has aptly stated, "Property owners have no greater ally [than Justice Scalia]
on the Court."/d. at 1118.
" See Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (admitting that
the founding fathers did not necessarily envision regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, yet
assigning to the court the task of making policy judgments about which threats are serious enough to
justify a public response and which are not). Notably, the policy judgment made by the Lucas
majority proved wrong. In 2008, only a publicly funded artificial beach renourishment project could
save the luxury condominiums and homes of the private golf and tennis subdivision, in which the
lots at issue in Lucas sit, from erosion and rising seas. See Wild Dunes Resort, Beach Restoration,
http://www.wilddunes.com/beach-nourishment.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). In a video describing
the beach replenishment project, a Wild Dunes employee asserted that through storms and erosion,
"we even lost part of our eighteenth hole," but through cooperation with the state and the city, they
will even be able to "turn the eighteenth hole back into a par 5." Id. Another video, which includes
similar assertions, is also available at Wild Dunes Resort, Golf, http://www.wilddunes.com/south-
carolina-golf-courses.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 229-30 (1990) (criticizing
readings of the Takings Clause as permitting judicial override of legislative judgment).
4 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827-28 (1987).
Id. Takings law generally rests on the principle that a prospector is not entitled to
compensation for simply moving to an area with development prohibitions and then filing a takings
claim based on the inability to develop the property because the prohibition on development is
presumed included in the purchase price. See. e.g., Dana, supra note I, at 1263-65. However, the
Nollan majority makes no mention of the fact that the Nollan's purchased property in an area with an
existing comprehensive government policy of requiring all similarly situated owners to facilitate the
exercise of public trust rights by conferring a public walking corridor along the water's edge as a
condition to development. See id. (surveying academic literature on the role of the Takings Clause
as security to otherwise risk-averse investors' fears regarding regulatory regime change). The
[Vol. 33:2
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"the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police power as a
'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest., 47  Following this
reference to Agins' "substantially advance" test,48 he continued by stating that
the Court is "inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective ['substantial']
where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a
land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated
police-power objective. '49
The Nollan majority saw regulating agencies as monopolistic opportunists
that manipulate defenseless private property owners. The court concluded that a
public foot access easement did not bear an "essential nexus," or qualitative
connection, to the visual access impacts of the proposed development, thereby
imposing a more stringent level of scrutiny than courts traditionally employed
when assessing land use actions.50 Indeed, the majority opinion termed one of
the government's justifications for the walking easement condition a "made-up
purpose.",5' As one scholar has suggested, this reflected the view that the
Commission's rationale served as a "trick" to achieve an objective-a
continuous public walking corridor along the water's edge-without paying for
it.52
That the perspective of the Nol/an majority has been attributed to a faction
majority also did not focus upon the fact that the requested public access corridor lay seaward of a
tall existing seawall on the Nollan's property, which likely would have made it difficult for the
Nollans even to see from their upland property any members of the public that chose to traverse the
corridor in light of the fact that the seawall was "located very near to the mean high water line."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 851 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Justice Brennan noted
that, even "[w]hen the beach is at its largest, the seawall is about 10 feet from the mean high-tide
mark; during the period of the year when the beach suffers erosion, the mean high water line appears
to be located either on or beyond the existing seawall." Id.
17 Nollan,483 U.S. at 841.
41 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (asserting that a land use regulation
restricting development density did not constitute a taking because it "substantially advanced" the
state interest of discouraging "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space to urban uses")
(internal citation omitted).
41 Id. Professor Lazarus notes that the questions at oral argument centered on individual
autonomy to construct a secure home on residential property, concerns that appeal to both liberal and
conservative-minded jurists and scholars, as opposed to the values in progressive redistributive state.
programs. See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1125-26.
s" Some scholars have referred to the standard of scrutiny under the "essential nexus" test as a
form of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 1766. For a discussion of whether the
test enunciated in Dolan also bears markings of strict scrutiny, see infra notes 89-111 and
accompanying text.
"' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839 n.6.
52 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 1764.
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known as the "Property Rights Movement ' 53 may be misleading. Justice
Brennan's dissent also aims to protect property rights, albeit of a different kind.
Justice Brennan asserted that strong property rights come only with reciprocal
respect for fellow landowners. 54 He expressed confidence that the government
ordinarily acts in good faith and needs flexibility to prevent the types of
externalities forced on the public by developers. 5 5 Justice Brennan praised the
expertise and reasonability of the Commission, and asserted it is the "private
landowners who threaten the disruption of settled public expectations.
56
The majority perceived the case from the vision of a public-choice theorist.
They read the Constitution as supporting a market-based philosophy that
regulators, like any private actor, make decisions based solely on political self-
5 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 513, 513 (2005); David Helvarg, Legal Assault on the Environment: "Property Rights"
Movement, NATION, Jan. 30, 1995, vol. 260, Issue 4, at 126; STEVEN J. EAGLE, CATO INSTITUTE,
THE BIRTH OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, No. 404 (2001),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa404.pdf.
54 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) ("The public's
expectation of access considerably antedates any private development on the coast"). See also Carol
M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 365 (1996).
55 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority's insistence
on a precise fit between development impacts and condition costs will "hamper[ ] the
[government's] ability to fulfill its public trust mandate"). But see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
government abused its power).
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 845 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Dissenting in another takings case decided
in the same year as Nollan, Justice Stevens echoed Justice Brennan's Nollan narrative in remarking
on the value of having "important governmental decisions ... made in an orderly, fully informed
way ... [in a] democratic government." See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 339 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting temporary
burden on citizens due to delay in permitting process is worth having an organized, democratic land
use system). In a dissent in Nollan, separate from that of Justice Brennan's, Justice Stevens
criticized Justice Brennan's joining the majority in First English, stating,
I write today to identify the severe tension between [the decision in First English]
and the view expressed by Justice Brennan's dissent in this case that the public
interest is served by encouraging state agencies to exercise considerable flexibility
in responding to private desires for development in a way that threatens the
preservation of public resources. I like the hat that Justice Brennan has donned
today better than the one he wore in San Diego [where Justice Brennan dissented,
suggesting the government may be liable to compensate property owners for
temporary takings], and I am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments
here. Even if his position prevailed in this case, however, it would be of little
solace to land-use planners who would still be left guessing about how the Court
will react to the next case, and the one after that. As this case demonstrates, the rule
of liability created by the Court in First English is a shortsighted one. Like Justice
Brennan, I hope that a 'broader vision ultimately prevails.' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 867
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (citations omitted).
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centeredness. 57  These Justices determined that allaying the powers of
governmental regulators required developing takings jurisprudence in an
instrumental way. This required abandoning ad hoc tests in favor of a set of
formalistic rules, of which the "essential nexus" test is arguably one. Such
formalism has proven to be the chosen course for those U.S. Supreme Court
Justices concerned with run-away government agencies.58
This approach stood in stark contrast to Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice
Brennan adhered to the normative interest in the common good and assumed the
government most often is sincere in acting for that purpose.59 This brand prefers
a pragmatic model to inflexible formulaic rules.
Recognizing that the descriptions in the majority and dissent in cases like
Nollan may not be a recitation of the facts at hand calls for an alternative
explanation. As foreshadowed above, the opinions may be viewed best as an
announcement of broader perspectives on social structure. Examining the cases
in this light exposes the difficulties in splicing some clarity from the decision's
midst moving forward. It can lead to a simultaneously. humbling, frustrating,
cynical, and polarizing outlook on takings jurisprudence in legal scholarship that
seeks to reconcile these competing perspectives.6 ° Some legal scholars even
have suggested that such reconciliation may be futile.6'
However, policy-driven, formalistic interpretation of factual circumstances
11 See Lazarus, supra note 19, at I 101 (highlighting difficulties in maintaining a stable majority
in regulatory takings cases).
51 See, e.g., Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (formulating per se rule for
government restriction on property use that results in the loss of all economic value); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(permitting compensation for time period regulation is in effect, even if the government terminates
the regulation immediately upon a takings finding); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (declaring per se takings rule for government actions that result in
physical occupations). See also Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438 (Cal. 1996) (plurality)
(finding that the city was engaged in "regulatory leveraging" with respect to a permit condition
requiring the payment of a recreation fee, declaring the condition a "veiled exercise of the power of
eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations").
51 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 1771 ("republicans like Stevens and Brennan view
government regulators as saints, while public-choice theorists like Rehnquist and Scalia regard them
as villains"). But see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 347-
51 (1988) (suggesting public-choice theorists are not villainous but rather act as dominant interest
groups hoping to facilitate re-election efforts).
1) See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 1754 ("Recognizing that the descriptions are only
narratives exposes the contestability of every public conversation about basic visions of the
appropriate political ordering of our society."). For examples of the polarization in the academic
debate over the takings clause, compare, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (contending that the Takings Clause renders zoning
and other land use controls as constitutionally suspect), with Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 279, 292 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's view as too simplistic).
6' See Lazarus, supra note 19, at 1107.
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can lead to dead ends at times. As discussed below, this may be evident in
Lingle, where the Court's hand arguably was forced some twenty-two years after
Nollan.62 However, just seven years after Nollan, Dolan did not represent such
an end. Rather, it served as the next logical step for a Court that perceived the
government as empowered and a threat to its vision of social order.
C. Quantitative Extent
The political visions evinced in Dolan63 are more tempered than in Nollan,
though still discernible. Florence Dolan owned a 1.67-acre parcel and sought a
permit to double the size of her creek-front, 9,700 square foot hardware store,
install an additional complementary structure, and expand and pave the store's
parking lot.64 One side of the lot fronted the City of Tigard's main street; the
other side lay within the 100-year floodplain.65
In accord with its municipal development code, the city granted the permit
conditioned on two dedications of land.66 The first involved the conveyance of a
small strip of property within the 100-year floodplain.67 The second dedication
encompassed an additional fifteen-foot corridor landward of the 100-year
floodplain. 68  The city asserted the dedicated floodplain would serve as a
permeable area to allay drainage concerns. 69  The dedicated upland would
operate to offset th traffic impacts associated with the new development.
70
A neighboring developer reportedly had made a similar dedication of land
along the creek. Dolan, however, sought a variance. 7' The City's variance
procedures allowed applicants to recommend alternative measures that would
mitigate the development's anticipated impacts. 72  However, Dolan did not
73
recommend any such measures.
62 For a discussion of this possibility, see infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.
13 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) ("Cities have long engaged in the
commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization particularly in
metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city's goals ... are laudable, but there are outer limits on
how this may be done.").





69 Id. at 382.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 380.
72 Id. at 380-81.
73 Id. at 381.
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The local land use board denied Dolan's variance request.7 4 The board found
it a reasonable assumption that the floodplain dedication would address the
projected increases in storm water flow resulting from increased impervious
cover.75 It also found that the dedication for the bicycle path "could offset some
of the ... traffic congestion" resulting from additional customers and
employees.7 6 The local land use board of appeals, the Oregon Court of Appeals,
and the Oregon Supreme Court, subsequently affirmed the variance denial and
rejected Dolan's iakings claim. 77 However, in 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and remanded.78
Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision for the majority called it "axiomatic" that
increasing a development's footprint will increase flooding.7 9 Further, he stated
"we have no doubt" that a larger retail facility on the property will increase
traffic on the streetss ° Thus, the Court had no concern that the conditions at
issue in Dolan met Nollan's "essential nexus" test.8' Nevertheless, the court
also declared that the city must make "some sort of individualized
determination. 8 2 This new step involved assessing whether the cost to Dolan
from allowing public "trampling along [their] floodplain" and an adjacent path
is "roughly proportionate" to the benefits the conditions will provide in
mitigating the impacts associated with the new development.
3
Did the Dolan court rely upon its 1980 opinion in Agins? As stated above, a
regulation amounts to a taking under the Agins test if it does not "substantially
advance a legitimate state interest."8 4 The court's opinion in Nollan appeared to
rely heavily on Agins. 85 Indeed, Nollan made only a fleeting, implicit reference
to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.8 6 However, this implicit reference
74 Id.
71 Id. at 382.
76 Id. at 381-82 (citing city's calculation that the increased size of the retail store would add
435 car trips to the area per day).
11 Id. at 382-83.
71 Id. at 396.
19 Id. at 392.
o Id. at 395.
x' Id. at 397 ("The Court recognizes as an initial matter that the city's conditions satisfy the
,essential nexus' requirement . . . because they serve the legitimate interests in minimizing floods
and traffic congestions.").
12 Id. at 391.
13 Id. at 391-93, 395.
4 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (describing the Agins test).
15 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (declaring that an ordinance limiting
development to single family houses and density restrictions allowing plaintiffs to construct a
maximum of five houses on their five acre tract substantially advanced the legitimate state interest of
protecting against the ill effects of urbanization and thus did not constitute a taking).
I Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) ("The evident constitutional
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to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine became an explicit, albeit terse, one
in Dolan.
The Dolan majority grounded its holding in
the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,'
[whereby] the government may not require a person to give up
a constitutional right-here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use-in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no
81relationship to the property.
Still, Dolan referenced a standard akin to the Agins "substantial
advancement" test, stating, "[A] use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose.""
The Dolan court departed from the general rule applicable to zoning and other
use restrictions that the burden properly rests on the party challenging the
regulation to prove that it arbitrarily restricts a property right.8 9 Instead, the
Court declared that the government bears the burden "to justify the required
dedication."90 The Court asserted that the city had not met this burden because
it failed to demonstrate (1) why a private conservation restriction, as opposed to
propriety disappears ... if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition.").
"7 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (citations omitted). In other words, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine states that even where the government is not constitutionally
required to grant a particular privilege or benefit, once it offers that privilege or benefit, it may not
condition it upon the recipient's yield of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Been, supra note I, at 473-
74; Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1988). The doctrine runs counter to a "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument,
which suggests that, for example, because the government has authority to prohibit gambling, it
necessarily must have the power to restrict gambling advertising. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-47 (1986).
s Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388.
x See id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court has made a serious error by abandoning
the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city
implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan.").
" Id. at 391, n.8 ("Justice Stevens' dissent takes us to task for placing the burden on the city to
justify the required dedication. He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable
zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it
constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. Here, by contrast, the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city.").
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a public dedication, could not control flooding threats,9' and (2) that the public
pedestrian and bicycle path "will, or is likely to," (as opposed to "could,")
address the projected traffic congestion. 2
A dissent authored by Justice Stevens countered that, given the proposed use
of the property as a store, "it seems more likely that potential customers
'trampling along petitioner's floodplain' are more valuable than a useless
parcel of vacant land. 93 Further, he stated, "Everyone agrees that the bike path
'could' offset some of the increased traffic flow that the larger store will
generate. 94  Justice Stevens continued, "If the Court proposes to have the
federal judiciary micro-manage state decisions of this kind ... property owners
have surely found a new friend.,
95
As an alternative to the majority's "rough proportionality" test, Justice
Stevens proposed that the Court concentrate on the qualitative nature of the
exaction, as required by Nollan.96  He suggested that the judiciary "venture
beyond considerations of a condition's nature or germaneness only if the
developer establishes that a concededly germane condition is so grossly
disproportionate to the proposed development's adverse effects that it manifests
motives other than land use regulation on the part of the city."97
The papers of Justice Harold Blackmun ("Blackmun Papers")-made-public
in 2004-suggest that Dolan's heightened scrutiny of land use exactions, and
1' In addition, the majority wanted the city to produce more data to show the flood control
capacity needed to accommodate the increased runoff from the new construction and how it related
to the extent of the floodplain requested to be dedicated. However, the city already had a master
drainage plan showing the effects of additional impervious coverage in the area of Dolan's proposed
commercial development. Id. at 378. In effect, the Court suggested that if there is an alternative that
can accomplish flood control without requiring a physical dedication of property, such a dedication
cannot be sought. Justice Stevens' dissent suggested that the heightened review engaged in by the
majority harkened back to the strict substantive due process analysis of the early 1900s. Id. at 406
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Lochner, which struck
down a state law restricting the number of hours that a baker could work each week to 60, is
attributed with igniting a string of judicial decisions invalidating federal and state legislation as
violative of substantive due process until the establishment of the modem deferential test in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of state minimum wage
legislation).
12 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993)
(Peterson, C.J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens declared this distinction as a mere
"play on words." Id. at 404 (Stevens, J. dissenting). As the city already had made thorough findings
relating to increased traffic congestion, the Court apparently desired an estimate of how many car
trips use of the bicycle path would avoid.
13 Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 404-05.
95 Id. at 405.
91 Id. at 403.
"7 Id. (emphasis added).
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the corresponding requirement that the government make "some sort of
individualized determination, '98 was almost not to be. 99 In Dolan, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cites to the varied state approaches used to determine the sufficiency
of condition justifications.00 The Blackmun Papers suggest -that the Chief
Justice's initial draft favored pure adoption of the "reasonable relationship"
standard favored by many states.' 0' This standard is a derivative of tests
espoused in state courts in Minnesota, 0 2 Nebraska,0 3 Texas,tt 4 Utah,'0 5 and
Wisconsin,0 6 where the burden rests on the plaintiff to show lack of such a
relationship.'0 7  However, a post-conference letter from Justice Scalia to his
brethren convinced the Chief Justice to include the more demanding "rough
proportionality" standard, 0 8 so as not to "'risk watering ... down' the
'substantially advance' language of Agins."' 0 9  Chief Justice Rehnquist
' See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the
Propery Rights Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGs L.J. 759, 807 (2006) (offering a
meticulous analysis of the Blackmun Papers in the context of property rights issues).
... See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91.
"" See Lazarus, supra, note 99, at 807 ("While the state courts were divided concerning whether
the condition must satisfy a 'reasonable relationship' or a more demanding 'substantial relationship'
test to pass constitutional scrutiny, Rehnquist [in his initial draft] decided to adopt the 'reasonable
relationship' approach while contluding that the City had not met its burden under that standard
under the facts of this case.").
(02 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91 (citing Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.
1976)).
111 Id. (citing Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)).
(U Id. (citing City of Coll. Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984)).
"J Id. (citing Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979)).
Id. (citing Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965)).
10'7 See, e.g., Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447-48. See also Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 338
So. 2d 863, 866-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
'" See, e.g., Wald Corp., 338 So. 2d at 866 (describing "reasonable relationship" test as placing
a heavy burden on the property owner). But see Homebuilders Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin
Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 62 P.3d 404 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (pondering the meaning of the "reasonable
relationship" test and suggesting it amounts to the same standards as Dolan's "rough
proportionality" test).
"i See Lazarus, supra note 99, at 807 (citing Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-518 (May 13, 1994)). A responsive letter from Justice David
Souter favored a far lesser standard, whereby the government would need to show only that "the
burden is not grossly disproportionate to the burden being added by the private party as well as to the
benefit being conferred on the private party." See Lazarus, supra, note 99, at 808 (citing Letter from
Justice David H. Souter to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-518 (May 17, 1994)).
Though originally voting in conference in favor of Mrs. Dolan, Justice Souter ultimately wrote his
own dissent. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 411-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). Professor Lazarus suggests this
about-face by Justice Souter stemmed from his frustration with the Chief Justice's acquiescence to
Justice Scalia's demands. See Lazarus, supra note 99, at 808. While the Chief Justice's opinion still
likens the "rough proportionality" test to the "reasonable relationship" test, the two tests cannot be
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presumably coalesced, for the opinion adopted the "rough proportionality" test
that ultimately placed the burden of proof on the regulating agency." 0 To the
extent this test sought to avoid undermining the scrutiny of Agins' "substantially
advance" analysis, the court was forced, in the words of Justice Scalia, to "eat
crow" fifteen years later in Lingle.'''
II. LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.: NARROWING THE CONFINES OF
EXACTION TAKINGS SCRUTINY
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected Agins' "substantially advance"
inquiry as an appropriate takings test in Lingle." 2  In essence, the Court
repudiated the test Nollan and Dolan ostensibly had relied upon. This Part
explains that while Lingle was not a permit condition case per se, the Court, in
dicta, attempted to provide some clarification on the remaining relevance and
import of Nollan and Dolan.
A. Repudiating the "Substantially Advance" Test
Lingle concerned Chevron's challenge to a Hawaii statute limiting the rent oil
companies could charge to the operators-of company-owned service stations."
3
The State of Hawaii asserted that:
the primary purpose of the rent cap imposed by Act 237 is to
avert the harm to Hawaii's consumers that will occur if
equated in light of this revelation in the Blackmun Papers any more than they can be equated
substantively. As several scholars have noted, unlike Dolan's test, the "reasonable relationship" test
applied in the noted states accounted for benefits, not just burdens, to the property owner from the
permit conditions. See, e.g., Suzanna Glover-Ettrich, A Newly-Minted Hurdle for City Planners:
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 559, 586 (1995); Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of
Tigard, Takings Law, and the Supreme Court: Throwing the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 231 (1995) (suggesting than a direct correlation between benefits and
burdens explicitly is not required) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987)). Indeed, even the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test that the
Chief Justice explicitly rejected as too demanding does not impose the rigor of the "rough
proportionality" test: of the five state cases cited by the majority as employing the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test, none are analogous in placing the burden of proof on the government.
See Kossow, supra note 109, at n. 86 (contending that two of the state cases cited as applying the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test "offer no real support" for "rough proportionality," and
the three others contradict Dolan's shifting the burden of proof to the government).
110 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
" At oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested the court was going to have to "eat crow" in
rejecting the twenty-five year-old Agins test. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 2 1, Lingle, 544
U.S. 528 (No. 04-163).
lIZ See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
"" Lingle. 544 U.S. at 533.
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Chevron and other oil companies raise their rents and squeeze
lessee-dealers out of the retail market for gasoline, leaving that
market dominated by the handful of oil companies serving the
State.' 4
Conceding that it maintained a return on its investment under the Hawaii
statute, Chevron contended that the statute nevertheless constituted a taking
solely because it did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.' '5 In
effect, Chevron asserted that Hawaii's scheme would not accomplish the stated
goal of preventing concentration in the market that would lead to higher prices
for consumers." 6 Chevron based this contention on the assumption that the
service station operators could retain the savings for themselves, instead of
passing them on to the public.' 17
The district court ruled for Chevron in holding that the statute did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest and therefore amounted to an
unconstitutional taking." 8 That court based its decision on expert testimony that
the oil companies simply would offset lost rents by raising wholesale fuel prices
and leaseholders would reap a premium reflecting the value of their rent
reduction when transferring the property to new lessees." 9 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, not only supporting, but expanding the type of
heightened means-ends analysis evident in Agins.
20
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered the "substantially advance"
test as applicable to a takings analysis.' 2' The Court explained that the test
enunciated in Agins originated in cases involving substantive due process
analyses, not takings. Lingle acknowledged that the citation to these substantive
due process cases in Agins was understandable in 1980.122 The Court grounded
this assertion on the lack of Supreme Court precedent on the Takings Clause
.. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9-10, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163). Hawaii's size
and remote locale plague its ability to participate in a competitive atmosphere for gasoline and other
goods.
"I Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533-34.




20 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom.
Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005) ("application of the 'substantially advances' test is appropriate where a
rent control ordinance creates the possibility that an incumbent lessee will be able to capture the
value of the decreased rent in the form of a premium.").
2' Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-45.
'22 See id. at 537.
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since Justice Holmes' enigmatic, "storied but cryptic"' 23  opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 24 in 1922. As explained in Part I above,
Pennsylvania Coal plainly asserted that a regulation that "goes too far" will
constitute a taking.
25
The Lingle court explained that the "substantially advance" test focuses
exclusively on the rationality and effectiveness of the government's exercise of
its police power.' 26 The Court concluded that assessing the legitimacy and value
of government action is not an appropriate inquiry for claims alleging a violation
of the Takings Clause. 27  Rather, the Court suggested that the "substantially
advance" test resembles a stringent application of the Court's ordinarily
deferential substantive due process analyses. 2 8 The Court stated that the Agins
test does not address the "magnitude or character of the burden" that a particular
regulation inflicts on the private bundle of property rights, nor does it address
the distribution of the regulatory burden.' 29 Together, the Court stated that these
elements, which emanate from the court's 1978 decision in Penn Central, serve
"as the principal guidelines for resolving [traditional] regulatory takings
123 Id.
124 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
125 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-41. The United States' brief in Agins, which intertwined the
substantive due process standard of Euclid and the takings standard of Penn Central, may bear
partial responsibility for the confusion over the "substantially advance" inquiry. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in support of the Petitioners at 29-30, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005)
(No. 04-163) (admitting error in Agins brief).
'26 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544-45.
121 Id. Since regulatory takings, or "inverse condemnations," are a derivative of the
government's condemnation power, and "[i]t would make no sense in a condemnation case .. . to
suggest that the govemment should be excused from its obligation to pay for a school site because
the school will serve a vital educational need," it makes equally little sense to suggest that the
government's regulatory takings liability always fluctuates with the legitimacy and value of a
regulation. See Echeverria, supra note 22, at 206. Professor Echeverria suggests, however, that the
public value of government action maintains some relevance after Lingle in that broadly applicable
regulations imparting community-wide reciprocal benefits should weigh against takings claims. Id.
at 207.
'2' See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542, 544-45. The Court explained that an imprudent regulation can
result in little physical or economic impact on a property owner, while an entirely astute regulation
can result in severe impacts. Id. at 543. Several lower courts had utilized the "substantially
advance" test to find compensable takings. See. e.g., Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887 (9th
Cir. 2004) (declaring unconstitutional a law that required landlords to provide successor tenants with
the same rental price as predecessor tenants); State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765
N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002) (declaring unconstitutional a zoning law that restricted use of the property
to single-family residential development); Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401
(Neb. 1994) (declaring unconstitutional a zoning ordinance that prevented an oil company from
obtaining a special use permit for a convenience store).
129 Id. at 539, 542-44.
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claims."13
0
Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court asserts that the "basic
justification" for allowing regulatory takings claims under the Takings Clause is
to determine solely whether the regulation is "so onerous that its effect is
tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster."' 31 In Lingle, Chevron sought a
131) Id. (suggesting that substantive review is "a task for which courts are not well suited").
Lingle's characterization of the "substantially advance" test as a "means-end" inquiry, as espoused
by the State of Hawaii, had been suggested by a small number of scholars for nearly two decades
prior to Lingle. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999); John D.
Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way out of a
Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993); Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in
Washington: Now You See It, Now, You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 351-52 (1989);
Glen E. Summers, Comment, Private Propery Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence
Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 837 (1993). Despite the U.S. Supreme
Court's explicit language on this point in Lingle, some scholars suggest that Lingle merely prohibits
use of the precise phrase "substantially advances." See David Callies & Christopher Goodin, The
Status of Nollan v. Califomia Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard after Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 565 (2007) at 569 ("one could narrowly
construe the Lingle decision to apply only to the precise language ofAgins 's (sic) first prong"); Alan
Romero, Ends and Means in Takings Law after Lingle v. Chevron, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW
333, 361 (2008). Commentators espousing this view suggest that some analysis of the means and
ends of regulatory acts survives Lingle to dictate the fairness in distribution of regulatory burdens
under the guise of the "character of the government action" prong of Penn Central. See Callies &
Goodin, supra, at 555, 569-70 (contending that, even post-Lingle, an exaction for a valid public
purpose that does not effectively accomplish that purpose is a taking); R.S. Radford, Just a Flesh
Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB. LAW. 437, 442-44
(2006) (suggesting that the Supreme Court identified the substantial advancement standard as one
addressing the causal relationship between the proposed private land use and the governmental
objective sought to be achieved in Nollan, rather than one addressing the means chosen by the
government to meet a public endj; Larry Salzman, Twenty Five Years of the Substantial
Advancement Doctrine Applied to Regulatory Takings: From Agins to Lingle v. Chevron, 35
ENVT'L L. REP. 10481 (2005); Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings
Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 573 (2007). But see Echeverria, supra note 22, at 203-08
(suggesting that Penn Central's "character" prong has been narrowed by Lingle such that it focuses
only upon whether a regulatory scheme results in a temporary physical occupation, impairs the right
to devise property, singles out one or a few landowners or contrarily generates expansive reciprocal
benefits, and is harm-preventing or benefit-conferring because "while it will sometimes make sense
to require those who benefit from regulation to redistribute the gains [e.g., historic preservation] to
those burdened by the regulations, it will generally make less sense to require those protected from
harm [e.g., flooding] to pay those who have been restrained from harming others and the
community"). See also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term
Impact ofLingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 343, 349-56 (2005) (contending that Lingle subdues any remaining function for Penn Central's
"character" prong).
1 1 Lingle. 544 U.S. at 537. As many commentators have noted, a large portion of lower court
decisions that cited to the Agins "substantially advance" test as an appropriate inquiry in a takings
suit involved rent control ordinances, where property owners alleged that such ordinances create the
possibility that the lessee will be able to secure the value of the decreased rent by charging a
premium for the benefit of living in a rent-controlled development. See, e.g., Daniel A. Jacobs,
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remedy of invalidation, as opposed to compensation. 3 2 The court explained that
the former sounds in due process, for assessing the validity of a regulatory act
necessarily must come prior to assessing whether a valid regulation effects a
taking.'33
Lingle thus eliminates "substantial advancement" takings claims, relegating
challenges to the merits of governmental action to the judiciary's substantive
due process jurisprudence.134 With respect to the appropriate standard of review
Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. on the Future of
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 478-79, 481 (2006); Radford, supra note 130, at
437. The Supreme Court has ruled that a mobile h6me park rent control scheme did not amount to a
permanent physical invasion of the park owner's property under the per se doctrine set forth in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982)). While Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Yee suggested that the ordinance
might not advance "the objective it is supposed to," the Court declined to consider the merits of the
claim under the "substantially advance" test because the question had not been presented upon the
litigant's petition for certiorari. See id. at 533-35. The Lingle decision lists a host of other Supreme
Court opinions that "merely assumed ... [the] validity [of the 'substantially advance' test] when
referring to it in dicta." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del-Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985)).
132 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
33 Id. at 543 ('The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a
legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property
subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense to say that the second owner has
suffered a taking while the first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may not significantly
burden property rights at all, and it may distribute any burden broadly and evenly among property
owners. The notion that such a regulation nevertheless 'takes' private property for public use merely
by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable."). Florida state courts recognized this
distinction well before the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Lingle. See, e.g., Tampa-Hillsborough
County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994); City of Pompano
Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc., 641 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Dep't of Transp. v.
Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). But see Romero, supra note 130, at
334-36 (contending that Lingle did not consider all possible meanings of the substantially advance
test and that means-ends analysis remains relevant in takings jurisprudence because government acts
that violate substantive due process but nevertheless are imposed for some period are compensable
under the Takings Clause). Professor Romero contends that "[t]he Court's rejection of the
substantial advancement test should not be taken as rejection of such considerations of means and
ends in takings law," arguing that Lingle merely prevents a lack of effectiveness of a government act
from serving as the sole reason for finding takings liability. Id. at 360.
134 Of course, takings must be for a "public use" in accord with the text of the Fifth Amendment,
though the court's "public use" inquiries are narrow. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005) (deferring to government decision to condemn isolated non-blighted properties in a
larger distressed area for an economic revitalization project). The differences between the Takings
Clause's public use requirement and the traditional substantive due process inquiry of whether a
government action is rationally related to advance a legitimate state interest provide fodder for an
interesting academic discussion. For purposes herein, suffice it to say that the refuted "substantial
advancement" language of Agins is markedly stricter than the substantive due process rational basis
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for such a due process-type challenge under the Takings Clause, Justice
Ginsburg suggested at oral argument in Lingle that "there are so many things
that [any skillful lawyer] could dress up as being a taking [and thus warrant
heightened scrutiny, were the Court to retain the "substantial advancement"
test].' 35  Seemingly interpreting Justice Ginsburg's statement to its logical
conclusion, one scholar asserted that Lingle "affirms the passive virtue of
[substantive] deference" to the state's exercise of its police powers.136
B. Insightful Dicta
It appeared that both Nollan and Dolan required application of the very
analysis rejected in Lingle-that exactions that do not "substantially advance a
legitimate state interest" may amount to a taking. 37 Indeed, Nollan stated that
the government's access corridor condition "utterly failed to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition."' 38 Likewise, Dolan asserted,
"A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advances
review.
135 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (No. 04-163). See also Lingle, 544
U.S. at 543 ("If a government action is found to be impermissible - for instance because it ... is so
arbitrary as to violate due process - that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can
authorize such action."). It seems obvious from the majority's opinion that due process queries will
be subject to the traditional deferential standard associated with such claims, where a regulation will
be declared unconstitutional only when it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare." See Lingle, 544 U.S. at
541 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). However, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence makes conflicting statements on the appropriate standard of review in a due
process challenge. He stated that a court must determine whether a regulation "represents one of the
rare instances in which even such a permissive standard has been violated," Lingle, 544 U.S. at 549
(Kennedy, J., concurring). However, some scholars have suggested that Kennedy's citation only to
his opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part)), suggests he would resort to a higher form of scrutiny than the
current due process rational basis test. See, e.g., Callies & Goodin, supra note 130, at 566; Sarah B.
Nelson, Case Comment: Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2006). Two
of these commentators have made the rather confusing assertion that states "are free to readopt the
[Agins] test ... as part of their state regulatory takings jurisprudence," despite stating that the Agins
test "does not remotely provide an adequate takings framework." See Callies & Goodin, supra note
130, at 564-66.
06 See Fenster, Constitutional Shadows, supra note I, at 732. "[T]he reasons for deference to
legislative judgments about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now
well established." See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
M See, e.g., McUsic, supra note 36, at 641-42 ("[lI]n Nollan and Dolan, the Court used the
requirement that a regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest to require the
government to establish an essential nexus between the means and ends of the regulation, and that
the regulation proportionately counteract a harm caused by the owner's project."); Daniel Pollak,
Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins Without Stepping on Nollan and
Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 929-30 (2007).
1" Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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legitimate state interests' and does not 'deny an owner economically viable use
of his land.""139  However, the Lingle Court took great effort in attempting to
explain that the Nollan and Dolan tests survive the repudiation of the Agins
test. 40  Lingle suggested the court's exaction decisions are not a product of
Agins but rather of the aforementioned unconstitutional conditions doctrine.' 4'
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the government may not
grant a benefit on the basis that the beneficiary must surrender a constitutional
right, even if the conferral of the benefit is discretionary. 42 In discussing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Lingle dicta focused on the physical
13' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). There was no claim in No/lan or Dolan
that the development condition at issue denied the property owner all economically viable use of her
land.
"" See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545-48.
'4' Id. (suggesting that, if not explaining how, the Nollan and Dolan tests are "worlds apart"
from the Agins test's delving into whether a regulation serves to advance a legitimate state interest).
Any distinction between Nollan and Dolan on one hand and Agins on that other suggesting that the
latter assesses whether "some" state interest is substantially advanced while the former two assess
only whether the "same" interest is substantially. advanced is debatable, as both require scrutinizing
the means and ends of a legislative decision beyond the traditional deference afforded to legislative
acts under longstanding substantive due process jurisprudence. While Nollan did not explicitly
reference the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Dolan later referred to it as a supportive, "well-
settled" body of law, leading one scholar to refer to the description as an "absurd statement.. when
constitutional scholars agree only that [the unconstitutional conditions doctrine] is as much of a mess
as the regulatory takings doctrine." Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note I, at 755. Another
commentator has contended that, unlike Dolan, Nollan had little to do with the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine but rather was purely a clarification and re-affirmance of the Agins "substantially
advance" test. See Romero, supra note 130, at 343 ("The Court in Lingle did not address the
possibility that a regulation might be for public use under the Takings Clause and might not be so
arbitrary and irrational that it denied substantive due process and yet still required compensation
under a substantial advancement standard that was different from those broader, more deferential
constitutional requirements."). Professor Romero continued, "The building restriction's purpose is
changed by the unrelated condition into a purpose that is not a legitimate state interest. The
constitutional violation in the Nollan opinion, then, is the failure to advance a legitimate state
interest." Id. at 387.
142 See. e.g., Been, supra note I; Richard A. Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard
Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42 (2000) ("[T]he
unconstitutional conditions doctrine operates to block some subset of possible bargains between an
individual and the government"); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional
Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENy. U.L. REV. 859, 859 (1995) ("The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine directs courts not to enforce certain contracts that waive constitutional rights."); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). See also Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ("[A] teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment."); Doyle v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 538 (1877). While a complete analysis of the modem application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to real property disputes is beyond the scope of this article,
the doctrine is in some ways as "arguably incoherent" today as Justice Stevens found it in Dolan
fifteen years ago. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nature of the walking corridor and bicycle pathway in Nollan and Dolan. The
court stated that Nollan and Dolan involved "government demands that a
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access."' 143 It explained how
these two exaction cases "began with the premise that, had the government
simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se
physical taking."' 44
In addition, the Court nearly quoted its 1999 opinion in City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.145 to "emphasiz[e] that we have not
extended [the Dolan] standard beyond the special context of such exactions."'' 46
However, the cited Del Monte Dunes passage did not include the word "such."
Parsing the Lingle citation to its logical conclusion, the insertion of the word
"such" in referring to the particular types of permit conditions at issue in Nollan
and Dolan may be instructive. Indeed, it could be read as a rejection of Nollan
and Dolan's inquiry into the government's purpose and wisdom for all but this
narrow set of exactions involving public, physical invasions.
This analysis of the Lingle dicta forecasts where prospective "essential nexus"
and "rough proportionality" review may focus moving forward. Exaction
takings may arise exclusively where discretionary permit conditions requiring
physical occupation of private property go beyond the appropriate nature and
scope of mitigating the projected impacts of the allowed development. 47 The
next Part explores why a unanimous Court might have made this declaration in
an otherwise contentious body of takings jurisprudence.
Ill. EFFICIENT ALLOCATION, INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS, AND
THEORETICAL INCONSISTENCIES
As evident in the discussion of Nollan and Dolan above, policy perspectives
differ markedly on the degree of discretion that should be afforded to regulators.
These differing perspectives are rooted in the confidence, or lack thereof, in the
myriad entities that limit and channel that discretion. But in light of the
heightened possibility of an unconstitutional takings declaration under Nollan
and Dolan, a risk-averse local government has an incentive to circumvent the
more stringent scrutiny of permit conditions.
48
Such circumvention often may come at the displeasure of developers, private
14' Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005).
I' Id.
'4 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
14' Linge, 544 U.S. at 547 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
141 See id. at 545-48.
141 See generally Dana, supra note I.
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landowners, and the public alike. In some instances, a municipality might over-
regulate by issuing outright denials. In others, it might under-regulate by
granting permits without any conditions at all. The former increases the
likelihood of rejecting projects that will result in societal improvements. The
latter interferes with the public's expectations by forcing it to bear the cost of
subsidizing the externalities of new development.
Stringent scrutiny of permit conditions also could encourage development
agreements with only repeat developers. These developers are less likely to
challenge conditions that might not fit the narrow mold of Nollan and Dolan at
the risk of irritating the regulators to whom they surely will apply again. 
49
Thus, not only could a general pattern of under-regulation or over-regulation
result in the denial of socially valuable development, but it could create an entry
barrier for all but the large, locally connected few.
50
Arguably limiting Nollan and Dolan to conditions mandating actual public
occupation of private spaces, the Lingle dicta could be interpreted to serve as a
partial antidote to these anomalous results. However, such dicta is short on
policy-based pronouncements. Lingle certainly clarified components of takings
1 Id. at 1294-98.
I5 Id. at 1297-1300. While majoritarian local politics could result in overregulation that does
not maximize the overall community's welfare, one scholar has asserted that there is no reason to
suspect that overregulation via development conditions will be any more attractive than
overregulation through development permit denials, which, as referenced above, are not subject to
Nollan and Dolan's heightened standards of review. Id. at 1271. Professor Dana gives an example
of a majoritarian sect assessing the gains (in land value) of prohibiting development versus the
maximum gain possible via development conditions: if the aggregate housing value would be
$200,000 if the development were prohibited and the developer would proceed with the project
despite an impact fee costing her greater than $200,000, the political majority would be better off
permitting conditional development. Id. Additionally, the public choice theory painting the regulator
as a sly strategist seeking to extort from developers, as set forth by the majorities in Nollan and
Dolan, can be turned on its head to pose the arguably equally likely threat of under-regulation
resulting from the influence of small, politically powerful interest groups. See, e.g., Alexander,
supra note 10, at 1771 (suggesting Scalia's opinion in Nollan reflects "a profound sense of cynicism
about the motives of governmental actors, an outlook that many commentators associate with public-
choice theory"). But as one scholar noted, "There are documented accounts of developers bribing
local officials, but apparently no such accounts exist of bribery by the opponents of new
development." Dana, supra note I, at 1273. See also Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note II, at
648-53 (suggesting that formulaic approaches to exactions ignores the fact that landowners have
recourse in petitioning the legislature and at the ballot box, and end up unnecessarily assisting
wealthy, politically powerful developers when only individual small plot owners need protections
from extortionate practices); Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1, at 746. The discussion of
public choice theory herein is admittedly simplified. For a more detailed look at the variety of
variables associated with corrective political action, see Vicki Been, The Perils of Paradoxes-
Comment on William A. Fischel, 'Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient
Regulation a Taking of Property?. '67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 919 (1991).
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jurisprudence that previously had been considered perplexing.' 5' Still, the
Lingle Court's reasons for preserving Nollan and Dolan's constitutionalization
of exactions in some form despite the reliance of these two prior decisions on
the rejected Agins test are not altogether apparent. 52
The Lingle dicta's seeming insistence on a more deferential standard for
judicial review of most development permit conditions conceivably could be
grounded in several theories. This Part analyzes three of these theories. The
first addresses inefficiencies in broad application of Nollan and Dolan and the
ability of state statutory law and local ordinances to restrain exploitative
exaction impositions. 53  The second centers on the functions of local
institutional controls such as municipal competition and voting.' 54  The third
theory surrounds inherent conceptual inconsistencies in applying Nollan and
Dolan beyond permit conditions requiring real property dedications in light of
the Supreme Court's reverence for what is known as the "parcel as a whole"
rule. 155
's See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Tern? Impact of
Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV.
343, 356 (2005) ("hopeless mess"); Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered
Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.J. I (2006) ("constitutional quagmire"); Holly Doremus,
Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2003) ("famously incoherent");
Echeverria, supra note 22, at 172 ("confused field of law"); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf,
Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2169-70 (2002)
("the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark"); Kent, supra note 11, at 64
(describing the regulatory takings doctrine as bearing a "general absence of predictability,
coherence, or confidence"); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) ("muddle").
52 Compare Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5 ("One would expect that a regime in which ...
leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the
State then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable) development
restrictions."), with Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545-48.
"I See, e.g., Dana, supra note 1.
04 See, e.g., Been, "Exit, " supra note I.
"I5 Commentators have offered versions of the first two theories in pre-Lingle critiques of the
Nollan and Dolan model. See. e.g., Dana, supra note I; Been, "Exit, "supra note I. In addition to
the three theories discussed in this Part, there are a variety of other perspectives on the prudence of
discretionary land use practices. For example, some courts simply have asserted that regulatory
restrictions represent "the price of living in a modem enlightened and progressive community." See
Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). See also
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (declaring that property owners must "bear the ... burden
[of regulation] to secure 'the advantage of ... doing business in a civilized community') (quoting
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). It also is conceivable that
heightened scrutiny of a wide range of permit condition options prevents implementing land use
policies that promote ingenuity and adaptation to modem day crises. See Joseph L. Sax, The
Unfinished Agenda of Environmental Law, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y I, 7 (2008).
For example, relatively new science indicates that traditional stream diversions in Mississippi for
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A. Inefficiencies in the Exaction Takings Construct
Exaction takings jurisprudence exists only upon the foundational requirement
that the government bears the ability to deny a given development permit in
total. As referenced above, permit denials are subject to a deferential standard
of scrutiny arising from the court's substantive due process jurisprudence, where
challengers prevail only when they prove that the government acted arbitrarily
or capriciously. Such limited judicial scrutiny of development application
denials matched with Nollan and Dolan's heightened scrutiny of granted permits
with conditions can diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of land use
regulation. 5 6 This section contends that Lingle's implicit narrowing of Nollan
and Dolan's application may have served as recognition of these detrimental
impacts.
If one begins with the theory that development should proceed only where
projects result in an efficient allocation of societal resources, Nollan and Dolan
operate to limit the range of available permit conditions. As stated throughout,
such conditions are confined to those bearing an "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" to the project's impacts on the community. These tests may
produce greater efficiency in development markets where prospective projects
are expected to create aggregate social benefits.' 57 However, the same tests also
may result in compensation requirements for conditions that are allocatively
efficient when social burdens are at stake. 58  Further, they may fail to
compensate developers for other allocatively inefficient conditions. 5 9
One commentator uses a hypothetical subdivision to emphasize the point.,
60
Assume a project will create negative social costs of $50,000 but those costs are
exceeded by the development's prospective social benefits of $150,000 (for a
net social benefit of $100,000). Nollan and Dolan nonetheless would permit a
agriculture and industrial uses are destroying aquatic ecosystems. See generally Timothy M.
Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 315 (2009). Conditioning
diversion permits, or amending the state's instream flow statutes, to require more water to remain in
the streams likely would not constitute a taking, even though it might mean a reduction in a
traditional economic use, because there is no property right to destroy fisheries. If Mississippi law
required more water to stay in its streams, businesses reliant upon prior diversions would be inclined
to pursue new technologies and more efficient practices to offset those costs. Id.
156 See, e.g., Dana, supra note I, at 1274-86. The option of applying heightened scrutiny to
development prohibitions, as well as to development conditions, is foreclosed by a deeply ingrained
democratic culture that even strong property rights proponents agree should not be intruded upon by
judicial policing of local land use decisions. Id. at 1300-01.
151 Id. at 1249.
151 Id. at 1248.
159 Id.
110 Id. at 1276-78.
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development condition without the provision of compensation.16' This results
because the Nollan and Dolan tests review only the gain achieved by the
condition in relation to the negative societal impact, and not the prospective
societal benefits.
62
On the other hand, assume the project will create a net social burden of
$100,000. A development condition costing the developer $60,000 to reduce
that social burden to $60,000 likely would be deemed unconstitutional under
Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard. The condition imposition is
allocatively efficient ($60,000 social cost, $60,000 cost to the developer).
However, Dolan measures the $60,000 cost to the developer against only the
$40,000 reduction in the social cost resulting from the condition. 63 The Dolan
test does not demand that local governments compare the social costs of the
impact-in that case, the increased likelihood of flooding and the hundreds of
car trips that the hardware store expansion would generate-with the cost to the
landowner of the required conditions.'
64
In addition, some social burdens resulting from development may be difficult
to mitigate Without substantial expenditures on methods of unpredictable
success (e.g., re-creating habitat for an endangered turtle). Other burdens may
be difficult or even impossible to mitigate (e.g., the sunlight lost on neighbors
due to the construction of a tall building, the alteration of a historic doorway,
etc.). From an efficiency perspective, conditions on new development need only
require internalization of the dollar-equivalent of the social cost.
65
Nevertheless, alternative conditions seeking to offset these social costs are
unlikely to withstand Nollan and Dolan's formalistic tests. There may not have
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1279.
113 Id. at 1279-80 (asserting that the only surefire way to meet Dolan's test and ensure allocative
efficiency in this hypothetical would be to "devise a remarkably effective new mitigation plan,"
where a $40,000 development condition somehow produces $60,000 in social burden offset such
that the condition is equal to the total social cost imposed by the conditional development). Even a
$45,000 condition that reduced the social burden from $100,000 to zero would not meet Dolan's
strictures if the condition reduced social costs associated with the development by $40,000 and
reduced social costs not associated with the development by $60,000, because Dolan only measures
the $45,000 condition cost against the $40,000 in reduced social costs that were directly caused by
the development. Id. at 1284-85 (suggesting that a condition requiring the installation of a bus line
to reduce traffic congestion resulting from new development might also encourage existing residents
to use the bus, accounting for the additional reduction in social costs).
i' ld. at 1284, n.149.
165 Id. at 1282-86; Been, "Exit." supra note I, at 544, n.333 ("It is no less rational for a
community to decide that it will accept an unrelated benefit to make up for the harm than it would be
for the community to accept a related benefit; indeed, if the related benefit would be valued less by
the public than the substitute unrelated benefit, it would be irrational for the city to reject the
substitute.").
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been Any options for the California Coastal Commission to force the Nollans to
internalize the net social cost of the blocked view resulting from the installation
of a large home under the "essential nexus" standard. Prospects include height
or width restrictions.'" Noting another possibility, Justice Scalia suggested that
public viewing platforms on the Nollan's upland property might meet the
"essential nexus" test. 167 However, these conditions might not relieve the cost to
the public of seeing a large row of homes interspersed with narrow segments of
water and beach. This sight could result in the feeling of needing to move on to
a more welcoming place to exercise public trust rights to enjoy the ocean and its
shores.
Even assuming the viewing platforms would relieve the social costs
associated with the development, this issue is not necessarily resolved. It is
unlikely that, if most homeowners were forced to choose, they would prefer
such a public platform on their upland property over a north-south transit
easement along the oceanfront. However, the formalistic majority opinion in
Nollan asserted that only the former could bear a sufficient nexus to the
viewshed harm created by the proposed development to pass constitutional
muster.1
68
The rigidity of the Nollan "essential nexus" test prohibited California from
bestowing a discretionary development authorization in exchange for a non-
"nexused" beach access way. This is the case even where said access way is
more efficient. The access way often may be publicly-favored, for it would
likely facilitate greater public use (including that of the Nollans) of a public trust
resource than any viewing platform could. 16 9 This lends support to the claim
that such stringent scrutiny may result in a lower net level of societal welfare in
some circumstances. Such an efficiency analysis may have prompted at least
some Justices to agree to the Lingle dicta's narrowing of Nollan and Dolan's
reach.
'66 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
I67 d.("[S]o long as the Commission could have exercised its police power ... to forbid
construction of the house altogether ... [a] condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of
the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose
sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.").
, See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
"'u Even assuming, as the majority found, that the beach accessway did not offset the harm
posed by the new development, some scholars have pondered why it matters. The new development
still imposes a public harm, and it seems the accessway condition is a rational substitute for that
public imposition that might have been difficult or expensive to counter directly. See Been, supra
note I, at 544. Whether those damages are spent by the public on a good related to the development
prohibition or on some other public good seems irrelevant in some sense, though it conceivably
could result in overregulation due to interest group clamor for the "proceeds" of the damages. Id. at
489-92.
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This efficiency analysis requires recognizing that local governments must
make several determinations to assess the efficiency of conditions. These
include anticipating and measuring the external social costs and benefits of the
proposed development and offsetting the two to arrive at a net external societal
cost or benefit. 7  Further, it requires calculating and weighing the developer's
cost of implementing a condition to determine whether it is equivalent to the net
social costs resulting from the development.'17  These costs and benefits are
difficult to assess, and often will not be precisely quantifiable.'
72
Some scholars suggest it is these inherent difficulties that lead to improper
development conditions because erudite regulators might convince benign
developers into bearing greater responsibility for societal impacts than actually
will occur as a result of development.' 73  However, others contend that the
judiciary is not in any better position than local regulators, and arguably in a
'worse one, to gauge and appreciate a given community's welfare.' 74  Even if
overregulation is conceivable in those localities dominated by majoritarian
politics, 75 developers have at their disposal the ability to petition their state
legislators to counteract any apparent regulatory ill-treatment.
76
170 Dana, supra note I, at 1266.
171 Id.
'72 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[t]n
our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize predictions about the impact
of new urban developments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental
harms."); Jack Estill et al., Taxing Development: The Law and Economics of Traffic Impact Fees, 16
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. I (2006) (suggesting the marginal cost of traffic impacts from development is
difficult to measure despite new technologies).
... See THOMAS P. SNYDER ET AL., PAYING FOR THE GROWTH: USING DEVELOPMENT FEES TO
FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE 78 (1986) (suggesting developers often depend upon regulators to
dictate what infrastructure they must provide); Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the
Ground: How the Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 103 (2001 ) (suggesting, based on empirical evidence, that local governments
often demand permit conditions that do not fully account for development externalities). But see
ALAN A. ALTSHULER ET. AL., REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE
EXTRACTIONS 58 (1993) (contending that developers often are more adept at negotiating than local
officials).
4 See Dana, supra note I, at 1268-69.
175 But see Been, The Perils of Paradoxes, supra note 150, at 920 (suggesting that "there is room
for debate about whether all or even most local governments" are dominated by majoritarian
politics).
176 Development permit conditions come in a variety of forms, from on-site requirements and
off-site dedications to monetary "impact fees." See. e.g., Dana, supra note I, at 1250-51. Some
states have imposed statutory limitations on the circumstances where, and the types of, development
conditions that can be considered. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-203(1) (LexisNexis 2009)
(extending Nollan and Dolan to fees as well as land, but limiting their applicability to individualized
exactions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27a-506 (LexisNexis 2005) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-8
(LexisNexis 2003) (prohibiting imposition of exactions for purpose of improving currently offered
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B. The Competitive Marketplace
Nollan and Dolan's "special application" of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine derives from concerns of coercive governments attaching excessive
requirements to conferred benefits.' 77 While some suggest that statutory
restrictions on regulatory discretion control such coercive practices, they also
may prevent local regulators from accounting for inimitable qualities of
development projects and preferences unique to their communities.' 8 . In
addition, there is considerable support for the position that government conduct
is adequately constrained by the state's resemblance to a private actor in
competing for opportunities to regulate. 7 9  This section suggests that
infrastructure); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 278B.280 (LexisNexis 2002) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5-8-
3(D), 5-8-13 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring waiver of legislatively imposed impact fee for affordable
housing and economic development if the development is expected to increase sales tax revenues).
See also Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation,
in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND
FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA 60, 61-77 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek
eds., 1995). In other states, regulators are channeled by guidance documents. See Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness-and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
'71 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (internal quotations
omitted) (suggesting exactions may be "an out-and-out plan of extortion"). See also Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (declaring that exactions may constitute "grand
theft").
7S See Dana, supra note 1, at 1301 ("strict statutory requirements may force regulators to treat
unlike situations alike"). Unique geographic, demographic, social, economic, and political
complexities are deepened in the modem day of rapid population rise, natural resource exploitation,
and abuses that are resulting in a changing landscape amidst a warming globe, particularly in urban
areas. See Been, The Perils of Paradoxes, supra note 150, at 919-20 (remarking on local
governments' abilities to take into account unique community circumstances and preferences).
Professor Fenster has suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court's formulaic nature of the exactions
decisions limits the ability of governments and landowners alike to negotiate permit conditions that
are more favorable to both parties, leading to disappointment for both proponents of vigorous land
use regulation and those favoring strong property rights protections. See Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note II, at 617 ("Bargaining over individualized exactions offers a means to
develop site- and dispute-specific terms of compromise."). See also Fennell, supra note 142, at 24-
34 (suggesting that a landowner who wants to build a gas station on residentially zoned property
might build a $400,000 town pool requested by the agency before rezoning, but the Nollan and
Dolan formulas largely prevent such bargaining to "offset" the development's environmental
impacts, though both the town and its inhabitants might prefer such a solution). But see Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-80 (1989) (contending
that categorical rules ensure fairness by limiting the discretion of judicial and administrative bodies);
Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 492 (1995)
(suggesting formulaic takings rules protect private property rights from the intrusiveness and
indeterminacy of local governments).
"' See Been, "Exit. " supra note I, at 476-78 (finding irony in position of law and economics
scholars traditionally distrustful of government interference with market forces, given their lack of
support for the market forces that can protect property owners from unjustly burdensome exactions);
2010]
University of California, Davis
acknowledgement of such controls also may have served as a partiaI impetus to
confine the Nollan and Dolan tests to a small sub-set of.permitting scenarios.
Prospective homeowners and business entrepreneurs have the option to select
another locality if they are discontented or frustrated by local government permit
conditions. Such "exit options" may render heightened judicial scrutiny of
exactions unnecessary, and, at times, imprudent. 180  Several scholars have
analogized the government's role in competing for residents and commerce to
the government's role as an employer.' 8' Further, the U.S. Supreme Court held
on more than one occasion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is of
limited necessity where the government is contending with private industry for
the same potential employees.
82
Even the strongest proponents of private property rights have admitted the
same. 83 However, they suggest that exit options in the land use context are
ineffective due to the immobility that follows once a developer invests labor and
capital at a particular location.' 84 Presumably, the argument follows, individual
homeowners are even more geographically limited and thus unable to exit at
will.
One critic of the exit option theory, Professor of Economics William Fischel,
argues that inefficient regulatory transfers need not be regarded as takings.
8 5
This is because the inefficiencies are spread across a wide swath of the
community that has other institutional controls at their disposal. 86 On the other
Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note I, at 758-774.
"SI See Been, supra note 1, at 476. But see William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox:
Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 897-98 (199 1)
(suggesting that while discrimination against outsiders rarely exist at the state or federal level, it may
exist at the local level, where those in charge of land use regulation may seek to impose burdens on
property owners who are unrepresented in the electoral process). See also Daniel A. Farber,
Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 130 (1992); Saul
Levmore, Takings, Torts and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991).
'8' See. e.g., Been, supra note I, at 477.
52 See. e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)
(asserting that limitations on speech may be justified in the interest of "avoiding the appearance of
political favoritism"); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding state conditioning
employment involved in national security upon waiver of First Amendment free speech rights);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (upholding policy aimed at assuring that official military
activities remain "wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind");
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding statute prohibiting certain federal
employees from participating in political campaigns).
13 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1988).
'4 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 184-85 (1993); Fischel, supra
note 180, at 891.
's' Fischel, supra note 180, at 866-70.
1)1 Id. ("My perspective is that of an economist and social observer who regards judges as only a
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hand, he asserts that efficient regulations, which are responsive to majoritarian
politics, are more likely to result in takings because they emanate from unfair
government action impacting a select few.' 87 Professor Fischel is adamant that
he is not suggesting inefficient regulations are more desirable than efficient
ones."'88 Rather, he contends they can be remedied by political and market-based
processes in a way that the burdens imposed on a minority segment of a
community associated with highly efficient regulations cannot.
89
Professor Fischel's assertion that takings inquiries should concentrate on a
property owner's ability to protect oneself draws broad scholarly support,
though the method of doing so is the subject of dispute.' 90 Some suggest that an
exit options serve this function well, and thus can stand as an appropriate proxy
for when the takings clause should be invoked.' 9' Comprehensive empirical
data thus far is unavailable, likely due to the difficulty of accurate compilation.
theoretically, though, while a locality conceivably could take advantage of a
grounded developer, such conduct could chill the likelihood of further developer
interest in that area. 192 The extent to which exaction costs fall disproportionately
on landowners and consumers, as opposed to developers, could alter the
application of this theory, though in many situations, developers, landowners
and consumers will share in these costs.
93
part, but a still necessary part, of the enterprise of protecting individuals from the excesses of the
siate. . . . [E]conomic inefficiency provides a means by which judges can identify a class of
controversies in which fairness considerations demand that they, rather than political and economic
processes, have to act to ensure fairness.").
187 Id.
' I td. at 867.
'x Id. In espousing this theory, Professor Fischel focused on rent-control, citing several
inefficiencies with the practice: low rates of return will discourage investment in rental housing;
landlords will have little incentive for common area and other maintenance upkeep; landlords will
exit the rental market altogether; and tenants "are apt to remain in their units longer than [they]
otherwise [would] in order to have the advantage of low rents." Id. at 866, 872, 875, 887-905.
While Professor Fischel asserts that these inefficiencies are broadly distributed and thus will be
remedied in the political process, that rent controls continue to persist nationwide suggests there are
variables that have not been taken into account in this model. See Been, supra note 150, at 920.
I'M See, e.g., id.
"t' See id. at 921 (suggesting pure application of economic theory to contend that highly
efficient regulations breed viable takings claims fails to account for the "differences that specific
markets might make to the comparative efficiency of a regulation").
'12 See Dana, supra note 1, at 1271 n.129.
'13 See Been, "Exit, " supra note I, at 541-42 (suggesting that developers will seek to negotiate
for the least costly exactions since landowners and consumers set the elasticity, or price fluctuation
sensitivity, of land supply). Professor Been thus asserts, "Even though the landowner has an
immobile asset, then, she will be protected against municipal overcharging through the bargaining of
the developer." Id. at 542 (describing the developer's bargaining power as providing "indirect
protection" for landowners).
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C. Inherent Inconsistencies of Stringent Exactions Scrutiny Beyond Real
Property Dedications
Given the collaboration inherent in authoring a unanimous decision, the
Lingle opinion surely accommodated competing views, particularly in light of
the sharp disagreements in prior regulatory takings cases. It is possible that
Justice Scalia's "quiet"' 194 addition of his signature to the Court's opinion in
Lingle may not have reflected a departure from the property rights principles he
has supported at least since Nollan in 1987. With some exception, the same may
be true for those other Justices that sided with the majorities in Nollan and
Dolan and remained on the court for Lingle.'95 Rather, the Lingle dicta may
have served as recognition of the imbedded inconsistencies of Agins' reach in
the permit condition context.1
96
Flowing from these inconsistencies, this section suggests that the Lingle dicta
grasped the limited options for preserving any logical role for the exactions
decisions that these Justices had strenuously supported in the past. 97  As
discussed in Part II above, Lingle ended Agins' support for a due process query
that allowed means-ends review in takings cases.' 98 However, it did find an
enclave for preserving the substance-like review of Nollan and Dolan in certain
narrow, yet not explicitly defined, land use permitting contexts.' 99 This section
See Nelson, supra note 135, at 288.
' This group included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
9(, Lingle explicitly billed itself as a doctrinal claritor. Justice O'Connor's opinion opened, "On
occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test [here, the "substantially advance" test] finds its way into
our case law through simply repetition of a phrase - however fortuitously coined." Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005). One law student pondered whether the
preservation of Nollan and Dolan in Lingle was a "force[d]...distinction." See. e.g., Nelson, supra
note 135, at 290.
"I As Justice Blackmun's Papers shed extraordinary light on the compilation of the takings law
opinions of the 1970s, 80s and early 90s, so too might the various Justices' conference notes shed
light on the unanimity in Lingle. While Justice Blackmun had asked that his Supreme Court papers
be released on the five-year anniversary of his death, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's requested
that his U.S. Supreme Court case files and related materials for the terms 1975-2005 remain closed
during the lifetime of any member of the Supreme Court with whom he served. See Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, Rehnquist Papers: Finding Aid for Materials from 1947 to 1974
Available to Researchers on November 17. 2008, Nov. 12, 2008,
http://www.hoover.org/hila/announcements/news/34359614.html.
' For a further discussion of Lingle's separation of the takings and due process clauses, see
supra notes 116-38 and accompanying text.
' For a further discussion of Lingle's preservation of some role for the Agins test in exaction
cases, see supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. Admittedly, if doctrinal coherence were the
only objective in litigation of constitutional issues, the Agins test might never have arisen. See John
D. Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy, 35 ENVTL. L. REP.
10577, 10581 (2005). Professor Echeverria suggests that both proponents of property rights and
those of strong land use authority "may... have found something to like" about Agins' fusion of the
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suggests that rejection of Agins' "substantially advance" test has implications for
Nollan and Dolan in light of the Court's relatively recent "admonition that in
regulatory takings cases [the judiciary] must focus on 'the parcel as a whole. ' 200
Conceptually, this "parcel as a whole" rule requires linking Nollan and Dolan to
a narrow sub-set of conditions that, if imposed in isolation, would amount to per
se physical occupation takings.
Before No//an and Dolan can apply, the imposed condition must constitute a
taking outside the permit condition context. This threshold easily could be met
under the heightened means-ends review of takings claims under the Agins test.
Indeed, even a condition that not only was "rationally related to" but "advanced"
a legitimate state interest could be considered a taking and subject to a Nollan
and Dolan analysis if it did not do so "substantially." But rejection of Agins as a
takings test leaves only three remaining takings tests that conceivably could
trigger the Nollan and Dolan inquiries. This section contends that two of these
three tests present inherent, prohibitory application hurdles in the exaction
context. Therefore, only the per se physical occupation test of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.2°' could logically serve as the underlying
foundation for Lingle's preservation of Nollan and Dolan analyses.
Theoretically, if the demand of a permit condition does not amount to a per se
taking under Loretto, any condition would have to constitute a taking under one
of the other two takings standards in isolation (i.e., absent its place as a
requirement attached to a discretionary permit) before Nollan and Dolan could
apply. Before reaching Nollan and Dolan, the condition either would have to
(1) effect a complete economic wipe-out in accord with Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission,2 02 or (2) weigh in favor of a taking upon application of the
balancing test assessing the economic impact and landowner's investment-
backed expectations as set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
takings and substantive due process clauses. Id. This is conceivable: the former might have seen
Agins' inclusion of substantive due process language in the takings jurisprudence as an avenue to
exact more stringent scrutiny of economic legislation not available under a true substantive due
process challenge since the Lochner era; the latterjust the opposite - Agins' reference to due process
might suggest that the Takings Clause involves no higher standard than rational basis review.
Professor Echeverria suggests that the government's victory in Agins must have left government
lawyers "hardly.. dissatisfied with the somewhat confusing but ultimately seemingly helpful co-
mingling of doctrines" in the decision. See id. In addition to the permitting context, scholarly debate
continues on the issue of whether the "character of the government action" prong of the Penn
Central analysis incorporates consideration of the government act's substantial advancement of a
public purpose, as well as the importance of that purpose. See supra note 130.
2"0 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)
(quoting Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606 (2001).
2)1 458 U.S. 419(1982).
202 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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However, applying these tests to conditions of discretionary permits
intrinsically is confounded when the conditions do not involve physical
appropriations. This is because Penn Central and Lucas address "economic" as
opposed to "physical" challenges under the Takings Clause. In order to
establish such an "economic" taking, a claimant must demonstrate that she has
204been denied all or substantially all economically viable use of her property.
While in physical appropriation cases the pre- and post-permit uses of the
property are irrelevant to a regulatory takings analysis, in all other instances the
reviewing court looks not solely at the economic burden on the portion of the
regulated property, but rather on the underlying property interest. 1 5  The
claimant's economic expectations are primary in applying this construct.
20 6
As the Penn Central Court explained, "[t]akings jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated., 20 7  Instead, in
determining whether a particular government action has effected a taking, "this
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature ... of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.2 08  The success of a
regulatory takings claim thus depends on the court's determination of the whole
unit of property at issue, which is expressed as the de-nominator in a ratio of the
value of regulated property over the value of the pre-, or un-, regulated
property. 20 9 Thus, under a Lucas or Penn Central analysis, the courts must
consider the allegedly burdened property in its entirety. This includes both the
current uses of the property if the permit is denied and the potential permitted
(including conditionally permitted) uses.
Hypothetically, presume this analysis results in a finding that the government
action renders the property valueless such that it amounts to a categorical Lucas
taking, or is otherwise found to be a taking under the Penn Central balancing
2 03 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a discussion of the
Penn Central factors, see infra note 22 and accompanying text. See also infra note 30.
24 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
205 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 33 1.
211 See. e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
217 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
208 Id.
21' See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). See also
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)
("To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the
relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of the parcel in
question."); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002) ("defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is
circular").
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test. Even a condition directly related in both nature and extent to the impacts of
the development, which would easily comport with the Nollan and Dolan
requirements, does not undo that finding. This is because that very condition
necessarily is considered as part of the original analysis of the parcel as a
whole. 2 '0 Therefore, applying the more stringent level of scrutiny of Nollan and
Dolan to a non-possessory condition imposed in conjunction with a permit may
be notionally untenable after Lingle's rejection of the substantially advance
inquiry.2 11 It appears that any other result would repudiate all uses of the Penn
Central balancing test, undermining the unanimous affirmance in Lingle of Penn
Central's pivotal role in takings analyses.
2 12
21( See Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope. 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577, 600-01 (2009).
As one commentator explained, the converse is also true: if a regulation that does not result in a
physical invasion does not impose a taking on a "whole" parcel, in accord with the proper analysis
considering the remaining uses if the permit were denied, the predicate for a Nollan and-Dolan
analysis is not met because there is no proof the condition violates the constitution in the first place.
Id. at 600-01 (2009).
2(1 Among the type of non-possessory permit condition scenarios relevant to the continued
viability and scope of the Nollan and Dolan tests, the U.S. Supreme Court has not shown interest in
explicitly reviewing the distinction between fee-based conditions and real property dedications. See
City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 803 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, Drebick v. City of
Olympia, 549 U.S. 988 (2006). Other questions regarding No/lan and Dolan remain outstanding.
For example, in light of Justice O'Connor's retirement in 2006, only one Justice who has voted to
review whether heightened scrutiny is applicable to legislatively, as opposed to adjudicatively-
imposed, exactions remains on the Court. See Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S.
1116, 1117-18 (1995) (Thomas, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In 2009, the
Court unanimously denied certification in a case seeking clarity on this distinction. See McClung v.
City of Sumner, 545 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, McClung v. City of Sumner, 129 S. Ct.
2765 (2009). For another example, three sitting Justices expressed a desire to grant certiorari in a
2000 case where a California court did not apply the Nollan and Dolan tests to the refusal of an
exaction that resulted in an outright permit denial. See Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco,
529 U.S. 1045 (2000) (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Thus, questions surrounding refused or withdrawn conditions, at issue in a case currently before the
Florida Supreme Court, may have a greater likelihood of being decided definitely in the near future.
See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (cert. granted
September 16, 2009,
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/review-granted/oralargument/2009/9/09-7 1 3oa.pdf). The
three Justices dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Lambert, namely Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas, likely will remain on the court for the considerable future, and three Justices who
decided not to review Lambert, namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Souter,
no longer serve.
2(2 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) ("The Penn Central factors-
though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have served as the principal guidelines
for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's exaction takings jurisprudence has created an
anomaly where lower courts must apply a more stringent level of scrutiny when
reviewing land use permit conditions than they accord outright permit denials.
This anomaly generates a strange set of incentives for government officials to
under-regulate, over-regulate, or engage in selective permitting for particular
repeat developers in an effort to circumvent the more stringent standard.
However, this article asserts that dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 opinion
in Lingle v. Chevron, Inc., for which the complete rationale has been elusive to
date, could be interpreted as an attempt to address these possibilities for
circumvention.
Of course, it is necessary to assure private property owners are not subject to
oppressive permit conditions. Indeed, the Nollan and Dolan majorities stated
this very goal in espousing the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"
tests. Therefore, the unanimous Lingle dicta must be grounded on some
accepted inadequacy or inconsistency in widely applying the Nollan and Dolan
tests to accomplish this goal. "This article has analyzed several non-exclusive
theories on which the Lingle dicta could be based.
First, the Lingle dicta may serve as an acknowledgement of the allocative
inefficiencies in applying Nollan and Dolan to a broad set of permitting
scenarios.. Second, it may represent a recognition that sufficient alternative
controls against coercive exactions exist, such as municipal competition and the
ability of voters to hold local officials politically accountable. Third, Lingle's
suggestion that the Nollan and Dolan tests are only appropriate in a finite array
of circumstances could be due to a revelation associated with the Supreme
Court's recent, convincing support for the "parcel as a whole" rule.
Nonetheless, in the nearly five years since Lingle, some lower courts have
disregarded this reading of Lingle's dicta and continued to apply Nollan and
Dolan to a broad set of permit conditions. 213 Such an approach perpetuates the
possibilities for regulator circumvention that flow from applying a standard of
scrutiny to permit conditions that is inconsistent with that for permit denials.
Admittedly, this disregard is not altogether surprising, for with sublime
ambiguity, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, "the life of the law has not
been logic. '2 14 Simply furnishing a description of the words in the Supreme
213 See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (applying
Nollan and Dolan to proposed conditions requiring the placement of a conservation restriction on
wetlands, in-kind offsite mitigation, and the payment of mitigation fees, even where such conditions
were never ultimately imposed).
214 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
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Court's opinions can simplify their prospective evolution, and for this reason the
import of Lingle may not be unraveled for decades.
Further, it is not simply in the reported lower court decisions where these
issues are relevant. Land use decisions are being made by government officials
in every corner of the United States on a daily basis. Thus, the search to find a
workable takings test to protect private property rights while allowing local
governments the necessary flexibility in conditioning permits to protect the
economy, the environment and the public health in our modern, democratic,
civilized society will continue. May the analysis herein serve a meaningful role
in that endeavor.

